Laying the Groundwork for a Rapid Covert Attack
Jan. 16, 2012: A.M. signs up for LinkedIn, using their work email and their favorite password, MomSaysImHandsome1234. They work for an outsourcer <OUTSOURCER>, and their company email address is in their profile. Six months later, LinkedIn is breached, and 164 million accounts are stolen, including encrypted passwords. Most of these are exposed in 2016.
March 20, 2021: <COMPANY> signs a contract with <OUTSOURCER> for server management. <OUTSOURCER> needs remote access to the network, and the security teams decide on a jump server or bastion host approach. <OUTSOURCER> has the responsibility to install and manage the jump server and selects JumpServer Community Edition. Because the jump server isn't integrated with anyone's identity and access management system, there is no easy way to enable multifactor authentication. The only thing keeping the bad guys out are usernames and passwords.
Sept. 15, 2022: Ethereum shifts from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake, and instantly, more than a million GPU clusters are now looking for something to do. A dark web hacker, E.G., takes all LinkedIn users starting with "A" and puts some of these clusters to work recovering LinkedIn passwords. A.M.'s password is long, but it doesn't have a lot of entropy and so is easy to recover, and E.G. now has their email address and password.
Nov. 3, 2022: A.M. is assigned to the <COMPANY> contract and is given an account on the jump server. In a breach of protocol, he uses his favorite password because cut-and-paste between his password manager and the jump server is disabled by <OUTSOURCER> IT, and he needs a password he can remember and type multiple times a day.
Feb. 22, 2023: <COMPANY> security logs show a normal level of port scanning from the public internet, about 3,000 probes per day. A compromised server at a Romanian hosting company is participating in the attack, under the control of E.G. The jump server at <COMPANY> is fingerprinted and duly logged.
March 29, 2024: CVE-2024-29201 is published. An Ansible input validation flaw is described that lets a low-privilege user become root on the jump server and see the JumpServer database: usernames, passwords and connection information. A patched version of JumpServer is available, but because <COMPANY> doesn't manage it, the server isn't patched. <OUTSOURCER> has more than 1,500 customers with jump servers, so it needs a time to do compatibility testing and to find a maintenance window to patch each customer. The result is that <OUTSOURCER> also doesn't patch the jump server immediately.
